working papers

My dissertation speaks to two different broader research agendas.

1. Long-run impacts of revolutionary mobilization

The first focuses on the effects of mobilization in revolutionary conflicts for long-run post-revolutionary inequalities, networks, and identities. I theorize and test for “bottom-up” processes of state formation rooted in mobilization. I also focus on the family as an important conduit for intergenerational transfers of benefits and networks centered on the nation-state.

The pull of the center: mobilization and state formation in communist revolution Under review.

Abstract:

I study how revolutionary mobilization forges enduring ties between remote localities and the state. Using a unique intergenerational and genealogical dataset from Laos, I test a historically influential view of communist revolutions, which sees individual-level mobilization into revolutionary political parties as central to the establishment of political order. In Laos, revolutionary mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s pulled in individuals from marginalized communities into positions of power. I find that descendants of such people were then more likely to work for the party-state than people from similar, unmobilized families. I also find differences in social networks and human capital. The mechanism of persistence involved family, and I find that mobilization impacted family socialization and conferred self-sustaining advantages, beyond “pork” from the state. I argue for a causal interpretation based on the dynamics of revolutionary conscription in these communities. Results are robust to an instrumental variables specification and sensitivity analysis.

Two possible future lines of research emerge: first, how do such processes impact regime stability? Comparative work on this question involving the countries of mainland Southeast Asia is a promising path forward. Second, how common have such bottom-up processes of state formation been in other revolutionary contexts? Could they help explain rapid expansions of state power following revolutions?

2. Authoritarian coalitions, dynamic incentives, and institutions

A second research agenda involves the formal modeling and empirical study of dynamic incentives in authoritarian coalitions. In another paper from my dissertation, I argue that institutional change during the third wave of democratization can be more parsimoniously understood by accounting for the impact of economic shocks on authoritarian coalitions. I study authoritarian institutions in the historical context of the 1970s and 1980s, when they steadily emerged across the world in a range of country contexts.

Sovereign debt, democratization, and authoritarian institutions in the third wave (draft available on request)

Abstract

Much analysis of democratization has focused on the effect of the end of the Cold War on bringing about a period of dramatic transition from autocracy to democracy and to hybrid regimes in countries around the world. Yet data suggests a remarkable continuity in trends towards democratization from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Additionally, though overlooked in existing literature, a steady trend towards greater institutionalization took place among autocracies from 1977 to the mid 1980s. I argue that both the third wave of democratization and the global move towards autocratic institutionalization were rooted in the weakness of many autocracies in building coalitions and managing social and factional conflict domestically in the context of deep external economic shocks. I formalize the idea that high levels of social conflict place increasing budgetary demands on regimes as they build social coalitions to block oppositions and stay in power. I go on to show how the very possibility of budgetary shocks can then cause autocratic coalitions to unravel in the absence of mechanisms of credible commitment. This happens because actors choose to launch favorable rebellions rather than risk unfavorable future rebellions launched by others.I empirically investigate key hypotheses by analyzing macroeconomic data as well as data on opposition events, cabinets, and institutionalization. In the process, I also present an account of authoritarian institutions rooted in the global history of institutionalization, where institutions emerge to avert coalitional unraveling during times of regime weakness.